Martin Feldstein's two pronged approach

Also in the Wall Street Journal today is a piece by Martin Feldstein. Here are some excerpts.

Further interest-rate cuts can reduce the risk of recession and increase output and employment in 2008 and 2009. The current 4.5% fed-funds rate is essentially neutral -- not low enough to stimulate growth and not high enough to reduce inflation. Although there are risks that the rise in oil prices and the falling dollar will raise the inflation rate, the greater potential damage of an economic downturn calls for a more stimulative policy. The Fed should reduce the fed-funds rate at its December meeting and continue cutting toward 3% in 2008, unless there is a clear sign of an economic improvement.

Because of current credit market conditions, there is a risk that interest rate cuts will not be as effective in stimulating the economy as they were in the past. The current credit crunch reflects not only a lack of liquidity, but also a lack of confidence in the creditworthiness of counterparties and in the accuracy of asset prices. This problem is now being compounded by the banks' loss of capital as they recognize past losses, and by their need to use large amounts of the remaining capital to support existing off-balance-sheet credits that have to be shifted to their balance sheets. All of this implies that lower interest rates may not raise lending and economic activity to the same extent that they did in the past.

The latter paragraph is a good follow up to Greg Ip's piece. In old fashioned Keynesian terms, what we've got here by this reckoning, is the basis for a liquidity trap. Later in the article, Feldstein adds the second part of his strategy.

What's really needed is a fiscal stimulus, enacted now and triggered to take effect if the economy deteriorates substantially in 2008. There are many possible forms of stimulus, including a uniform tax rebate per taxpayer or a percentage reduction in each taxpayer's liability. There are also a variety of possible triggering events. The most suitable of these would be a three-month cumulative decline in payroll employment. The fiscal stimulus would automatically end when employment began to rise or when it reached its pre-downturn level.

Enacting such a conditional stimulus would have two desirable effects. First, it would immediately boost the confidence of households and businesses since they would know that a significant slowdown would be met immediately by a substantial fiscal stimulus. Second, if there is a decline of employment (and therefore of output and incomes), a fiscal stimulus would begin without the usual delays of the legislative process.

You're probably familiar with the term "automatic stabilizers". Well this takes the concept to the next level. A tax cut conditional on economic data--that's an interesting suggestion. Unfortunately, the temporary nature of the cuts would tend to reduce their impact. Anyway, read on.

Even if the Fed decides that it should not cut rates further at the present time, it would not raise rates to offset the stimulus effect of the fiscal change. From the Fed's point of view, the tax cuts can provide a desirable short-run stimulus without the inflationary impact that would result from a lower interest rate and an increase in the stock of money.

Dust off your trusty old IS-LM model and let the fun begin.

Some reliance now on a fiscal stimulus rather than easier money would also take pressure off the exchange-rate adjustment. While further declines of the dollar are necessary to shrink the massive U.S. trade deficit, continued rapid declines might lead to counterproductive retaliatory actions by some of our trading partners.

Add a dash of Mundell-Fleming.

The excessive asset-price increases caused by some past monetary expansions -- especially the induced rise in the prices of real estate -- provide a further reason to use fiscal as well as monetary policy. By cutting the fed-funds rate to just 1% in 2003 and promising that it would be raised only slowly, the Fed contributed to the sharp rise in house prices and the market's current weakness. A mixed strategy that included a prospective fiscal stimulus would have reduced the Fed's perceived need for a sustained negative real fed-funds rate, and would therefore have produced a more balanced expansion of demand.

But didn't we cut taxes in 2001 and 2003? Yes, however those cuts were aimed in large measure at increasing long run growth--the success of which is a fair topic of debate. That's not to say that the short-run stimulative effect was nil. But the question is: would a temporary tax cut with a similar order of magnitude to the 2001 and 2003 cuts have any more stimulative effect? Or would people just save it?

Mark Thoma also mentions the permanent income hypothesis, but doesn't mention the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. Interestingly, a lot of prominent economists opposed the 2003 tax cut because they thought it should be temporary (contrary to Thoma) in order to provide stimulus without threatening the long term budget outlook and that it should include a spending component (in agreement with Thoma).

I think temporary tax cuts won't work very well (in agreement with Thoma) and I have my doubts about temporary spending increases (more bridges to nowhere?), contrary to Thoma. So where does that leave us?

With a lower funds rate in 2008, that's where.